KENNETH L. BUETTNER, Judge.

¶ 1 Garnishee/Appellant Equity Insurance Company appeals from judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Noehmi Rodriguez and Jesus Muniz (collectively, Appellees) who sought to garnish payment of insurance benefits after a vehicle collision. Equity sought to avoid garnishment based on the named driver exclusion in the policy, but Appellees responded that the named exclusion was void as against public policy, at least up to the minimum required liability coverage. The trial court agreed, and held that Equity must provide coverage for the minimum amount of liability coverage required by law. Oklahoma Supreme Court precedent establishes that a named driver exclusion is valid under the compulsory insurance laws and we therefore reverse.

¶ 2 The parties do not dispute the facts: on August 5, 2009, a car driven by Defendant Maria Gutierrez-Perez collided with a motorcycle driven by Muniz, on which Rodriguez was a passenger. Appellees obtained a judgment against Gutierrez-Perez for bodily injuries and property damage. The car driven by Gutierrez-Perez was owned by Jose Marquez and was insured by Equity. Appellees filed their Garnishment Affidavit, seeking to recover $25,000 each from Equity. The insurance policy contained a named driver exclusion which excluded coverage for liability or damage incurred while Gutierrez-Perez was driving the car, and Equity asserted it was exempt from garnishment based on the named driver exclusion. Appellees responded that the named driver exclusion was invalid as against public policy under current Oklahoma law.

¶ 3 The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, finding that the exclusion violated Oklahoma public policy because it left an innocent third-party without insurance protection. The court found Appellees were entitled to judgment against Equity for the minimum amount of liability coverage required by law. Equity appeals. A post-judgment garnishment proceeding may be decided by summary judgment where there are no material facts in dispute. O'Neill v. Long, 2002 OK 63, ¶ 9, 54 P.3d 109. We review the trial court's legal ruling de novo. Id.

¶ 4 Oklahoma's compulsory insurance law requires that all motor vehicles driven in Oklahoma have minimum liability insurance:

47 O.S.Supp.2009 § 7-601 (emphasis added). The purpose of this law is to protect the public from the financial hardship that may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible people. Harkrider v. Posey, 2000 OK 94, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 821.

¶ 5 Oklahoma cases interpreting the compulsory insurance laws have established that the "clearly articulated public policy of our compulsory liability insurance law plainly overrides contrary private agreements that restrict coverage whenever the contractual strictures do not square with the purpose of the Act." Id. Nevertheless, in Harkrider, which labeled the liability insurance contract as a "quasi-public obligation" and other cases discussed below, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the validity of named driver exclusions addressed in Pierce v. Oklahoma Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 1995 OK 78, 901 P.2d 819.

¶ 6 Before Pierce, the Supreme Court had held that exclusions of liability coverage for any driver under age 25, for any liability incurred beyond a 200 mile radius, and for all resident members of a household, were invalid as violating the public policy expressed in the statute. See Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 1987 OK 88, 743 P.2d 1084; Equity Mutual Insurance Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 1987 OK 121, 747 P.2d 947; and Nation v. State Farm Ins. Co., 1994 OK 54, 880 P.2d 877.

¶ 7 Since Pierce, Oklahoma cases have found many types of exclusions in liability policies invalid as violating the public policy expressed in the compulsory insurance laws.1 However, no precedential decision has overruled Pierce, and indeed, when § 7-601 was amended in 2009, the Legislature left in place language acknowledging allowable exclusions from coverage. (See emphasized text above). For this reason, unlike the trial court in this case, we are not persuaded by two decisions of other divisions of this court which disregarded Pierce and found a named-driver exclusion invalid. See McElmurry v. Garbow, 2005 OK CIV APP 38, 116 P.3d 198 and Alternative Medicine of Tulsa, Inc. v. Cates, 2006 OK CIV APP 65, 136 P.3d 716 (cert. denied). In McElmurry, the court declared "since Pierce, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has been increasingly willing to declare exclusions invalid when their application would deny coverage to innocent third parties." 116 P.3d at 200, ¶ 8. This statement ignores the repeated affirmation of the validity of the narrow named driver exclusion, in contrast to other types of exclusions, as noted above.

¶ 8 In Pierce, the court noted that the compulsory liability insurance statutes permit owners policies to include "exclusions from coverage in accordance with existing laws." 47 O.S.Supp.2009 § 7-600(1)(c). And, the court noted that without the ability to exclude a named driver, an insured may be unable to obtain the insurance required by statute:

901 P.2d at 823 (emphasis added). On de novo review, we find that the compulsory insurance statutes, as well as Oklahoma Supreme Court precedent, continue to uphold the validity of an exclusion from coverage of a named driver. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Appellees is REVERSED.

MITCHELL, P.J., and JOPLIN, J., concur.